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The purpose of this study was to determine how executive function (EF) ability modulates 
stereotype-derived responses on a specific implicit bias task at different response window 
lengths. Each participant completed two EF tasks and one version of the weapon identification 
task (WIT). The EF tasks were used to measure participants’ abilities to control their responses 
and the WIT was used as a measure of implicit racial bias. It was found that participants made 
more stereotypical misidentifications at shorter response windows and responded faster to 
stereotype-congruent trials at longer response windows, both of which directly replicate previous 
research. But, EF ability could only be used to predict bias in reaction times. This finding does 
not replicate previous research findings for stereotypical misidentifications, despite similarities 
in experimental design between this study and previous research. Because of the low number of 
participants per condition and the lack of consistent patterns of results, there are significant 
limitations in the conclusions that can be drawn from this study. Reasons for why the results 
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Response Window Length in the Weapon Identification Task:  
How Executive Function Ability Modulates Implicit Racial Bias 
 
Automatic and controlled cognitive processes have been the subjects of a large, and ever-
increasing, body of research. Historically, controlled processes have been defined as processes 
within conscious control that can be changed and require significant effort and attention. On the 
other hand, automatic processes have been defined as processes outside of conscious control that 
cannot be purposefully altered. The difference between automatic and controlled processes was 
demonstrated by Devine’s (1989) work on stereotype activation. In this research, she showed 
that when participants were subliminally exposed to stereotype-related words associated with 
Blacks (versus neutral words unrelated to race), they were more likely to rate a race-unspecified 
character’s actions in a narrative as hostile, regardless of the participants’ levels of prejudice. In 
contrast, when participants were directly asked to list their beliefs about Blacks, highly 
prejudiced participants were more likely to include character traits such as hostility and 
aggressiveness compared to less-prejudiced participants. Together, these two studies demonstrate 
that stereotypes are automatically activated regardless of people’s conscious beliefs, and that 
people who are motivated to control their prejudice are only able to do so when they are aware 
that the stereotypes have been activated. 
To date, much of the research on automatic and controlled processes has focused on 
prejudice and stereotypes, as in the Devine (1989) work. Originally, researchers used two types 
of explicit tasks to measure stereotyping and prejudice: direct and indirect tasks. Direct explicit 
tasks directly ask participants about their racial attitudes (these are tasks such as surveys and 
questionnaires). Indirect explicit tasks indirectly measure attitudes by obscuring the purpose of 
EF ABILITY AND IMPLICIT RACE BIAS   4 
 
 
the task to decrease the likelihood that participants will modify their responses to seem less 
biased. An example of an indirect task is the Funding task used in the current experiment, in 
which participants are asked to rank different student organizations by their relative importance, 
including organizations related to minority groups. Though the task does not directly ask for 
opinions on minorities, attitudes toward minority groups can be inferred from the rankings given 
to these organizations over other ones. It is still possible for participants to rank minority-related 
organizations as more important than other organizations in order to seem less biased, but this 
possibility is less likely when race is not made salient in the task instructions. 
Eventually, researchers found that explicit tasks often fail to accurately predict prejudiced 
actions, potentially because participants may be motivated to seem less biased (Devine, 1989). 
Therefore, there was a call to develop tasks that measure unconscious processes of stereotype 
activation separately from conscious ones, and implicit tasks were developed (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Payne & Gawronski, 2010). Unlike direct explicit tasks, implicit tasks can be used 
to indirectly measure attitudes by obscuring the purpose of the task and infer attitudes or 
stereotypes from participants’ responses, which is similar to how indirect explicit tasks measure 
attitudes. But unlike indirect tasks, implicit tasks are used to infer bias from the pattern of 
responses participants give on a task that is unrelated to racial attitudes (such as a simple 
categorization task). By obscuring the purpose of the task and not asking participants to 
consciously give their attitudes, it was thought that participants would not be able to respond in a 
“socially desirable manner” and that these tasks were only a measure of automatic activation of 
stereotypes. 
However, research has shown that scores on implicit bias tasks are malleable. In this 
context, malleability means that the participants’ responses on implicit bias tasks differ 
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significantly when the researcher changes the task. This suggests that either different implicit 
attitudes are activated under different conditions, or that participants are actually able to control 
the amount of bias they express on the tasks. If participants can control the amount of bias they 
express, then they can still respond in a socially desirable manner, despite the fact that they are 
not explicitly stating or being asked for their attitudes. Two types of task manipulations have 
commonly been used in previous research to demonstrate malleability of implicit task scores.  
The first are contextual changes, which alter what stereotypes are activated. Blair (2002) 
details many examples of contextual changes to tasks, including work by Wittenbrink, Judd, and 
Park (2001), in which participants were shown either a video of a Black family smiling at a 
barbeque or a video of angry Black gang members. After being shown the video, participants 
completed a specific implicit bias task, the implicit association test (IAT). Participants who had 
been shown the happy family had lower racial bias scores than participants who had been shown 
the gang members, which indicates that different stereotypes can be activated depending on what 
beliefs have recently been made salient about a particular social or racial group. 
The second type of modification is operational (i.e. procedural), which changes how 
easily a person can consciously analyze the situation and make a decision. For example, Payne, 
Lambert, and Jacoby (2002) showed that changing the response window length affected the 
number of stereotype-congruent errors participants made on implicit tasks: shorter response 
windows elicited more errors. If participants are able to control their responses and consciously 
reduce the amount of bias they express when the response window is longer, but show more bias 
when the response window is shorter, then implicit tasks cannot only be measuring automatically 
activated attitudes. This research suggests that implicit tasks measure both controlled and 
automatic processes. Like the aforementioned research, the current study focuses on operational 
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changes – specifically, response window changes – and how these changes affect scores on 
implicit bias tasks. 
The research on malleability has indicated that implicit bias task scores have both 
controlled and automatic components for every trial. Rather than considering automatic and 
controlled processes to be completely distinct, there has been a paradigm shift in the field, and 
now these processes are considered to be on a continuum for all responses. Thus, multiple 
models for determining the automatic and controlled components of scores have been created. 
One of the most commonly used is a dual-process model, the process dissociation procedure 
(PDP), formulated by Jacoby (1991). The PDP model uses separate equations to estimate the 
controlled and automatic components of implicit task responses – the automatic estimate is 
assumed to directly reflect automatic stereotyping and the controlled component is assumed to 
directly reflect cognitive control. The controlled component indicates how often participants 
respond correctly to trials because they were following task instructions. The automatic 
component, on the other hand, indicates how often participant responses were guided by 
automatic stereotype activation when control failed (see Jacoby, 1991 and Payne et al., 2002 for 
more details on calculating PDP estimates and the theory behind PDP). Using these PDP 
estimates, Payne et al. (2002) showed that at shorter response deadlines participants were less 
able to control their responses (lower PDP control estimates), but that PDP automatic estimates 
were unchanged by the response deadline manipulation. This result demonstrates that responses 
on implicit tasks are driven by both controlled and automatic processes, but that the magnitude of 
the controlled component depends on the response window length. 
Because the controlled component of the PDP is assumed to directly indicate cognitive 
control, some newer research has focused on how executive function ability modulates scores on 
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these implicit tasks. Executive function (EF) ability (i.e. executive control) is a fixed measure of 
how well people are able to control their responses. As shown in the Payne et al. (2002) study, 
how well participants were able to control their responses was influenced by the response 
window length. Unfortunately, since the PDP only gives indirect estimates of cognitive control, a 
verification that the controlled component does correlate with executive function ability was 
needed. In the Payne (2005) work, PDP control estimates were compared to EF ability by having 
participants do an EF task, the Antisaccade task, in addition to the implicit bias tasks. 
Antisaccade measures participants’ abilities to inhibit their automatic responses, which indicates 
how easily they are able to follow task instructions. The Payne (2005) study confirmed that EF 
ability and the PDP control component correlate with one another, thus solidifying the 
connection between EF and operational malleability of implicit bias scores. 
A related issue in recent implicit bias research is how to reduce the influence of executive 
control on implicit bias scores. For example, work by Siegel, Dougherty, and Huber (2012) 
looked at separating the influence of executive control from bias on the IAT (a specific implicit 
bias task) by inducing anxiety in the participants and using explicit tasks as a measure of racial 
bias separate from the IAT. They proposed that inducing anxiety decreases participants’ abilities 
to use executive control by taking up some of the attentional resources necessary for following 
task instructions. The results indicated that decreasing executive control ability increased the 
amount of racial bias participants expressed on the IAT. From this manipulation, Siegel et al. 
(2012) concluded that executive control is not only correlated with IAT scores, but that it directly 
affects performance on the IAT. 
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The Current Study 
The current study looks at how the effects of executive function ability on racial bias 
change under different response window lengths on the weapon identification task (WIT; Payne, 
2001). Though the Payne et al. (2002) study compared participant PDP control estimates to their 
scores on the WIT, actual EF tasks were not used to measure EF ability. Similarly, the Payne 
(2005) study used Antisaccade as an EF task, but did not look at how biases at different response 
window lengths were affected by EF ability. The current study uses two different EF tasks, 
Antisaccade and Spatial Span, to determine EF ability. 
Because implicit bias task scores have been shown to be correlated with EF ability 
(Klauer, Schmitz, Teige-Mocigemba, & Voss, 2010; Payne, 2005; Payne & Gawronski, 2010; 
Siegel et al., 2012), it was hypothesized that participants with higher scores on EF tasks, 
indicating a stronger ability to control their responses and follow task instructions, would 
generally show lower levels of racial bias on the WIT (racial bias is defined as greater accuracy 
on stereotype-congruent trials than on stereotype-incongruent trials). 
In addition, decreasing the response window length has been demonstrated to inhibit use 
of EF (Payne, 2001; Payne et. al, 2002). Therefore, it was hypothesized that participants would 
generally have higher racial bias on the WIT when there was a shorter response window (400 
ms) than when there was a longer one (3,000 ms), because there would be too little time to use 
executive control when the deadline was shorter. This main effect of response window was also 
expected to interact with EF ability. At longer response windows, participants with low and high 
EF ability were expected to have similar accuracy bias scores, because there would be enough 
time for all participants to use executive control. At shorter response windows, participants with 
low EF ability were expected to make more stereotype-congruent errors than participants with 
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high EF. Even though all participants would have little time to process the different trial types, 
participants with high EF would be able to control their responses better, as demonstrated by 
previous research (Payne, 2005). This means that participants with low EF would have higher 
accuracy bias scores than participants with high EF at these shorter response windows. 
In summary, the main effect of EF task scores on accuracy bias on the WIT and the main 
effect of response window on accuracy bias on the WIT were expected to be significant. The 
interaction of EF ability X response window was also expected to be significant, indicating that 
the effect of response window length would be stronger for participants with low EF ability. 
The predictions that have been discussed so far have defined racial bias only in terms of 
accuracy, but racial bias can also be considered in terms of how quickly participants respond to 
stereotype-congruent trials versus stereotype-incongruent trials. If stereotypes are influencing the 
speed of participants’ responses, then there will be a reaction time bias (i.e. faster reactions on 
stereotype-congruent trials than on stereotype-incongruent trials). Because of this, the effects of 
EF scores and response window lengths for WIT reaction time bias were also evaluated. As 
previous research has demonstrated (Payne, 2001), when participants have sufficient time to use 
executive control (i.e. when the response window is longer), they make fewer mistakes, and 
instead respond faster to stereotype-congruent trials over stereotype-incongruent ones. This 
means that when participants have less time to respond, they are more likely to have larger 
accuracy biases. As the response window length increases, the accuracy bias will decrease and 
the reaction time bias will increase. Therefore, it was predicted that the main effect of response 
window on reaction time bias would be significant. It was unclear how a person’s EF ability 
would be related to their RT bias, because it is possible that participants with higher or lower EF 
ability could react impulsively to stereotypical information. Therefore, no explicit predictions 
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were made for the main effect of EF ability on the RT bias or for the interaction of EF ability X 
response window length. 
Although not of primary interest, the WIT biases were also compared to first-person 
shooter task (FPST) scores and scores on different explicit measures of racial bias. Including 
another implicit bias task (the FPST) and various direct and indirect explicit measures allowed an 
examination of how manipulating response window length changes the ability of the WIT to 




One hundred and fifteen undergraduates at the University of Colorado completed the 
experiment for partial course credit. One participant was excluded from all analyses, because he 
pressed the same button for all WIT trials, regardless of the prime and target. Another participant 
was excluded from the EF analyses, because she was unable to complete the entire Antisaccade 
task (this individual was not excluded from the other analyses). All participants identified 
themselves as White. 
Materials and Procedures 
All participants signed a consent form before the experiment. The consent form informed 
participants that the purpose of the study was to investigate “how cognitive control processes are 
related to various forms of computerized and paper-and-pencil judgment and decision tasks.” 
Participants received a debriefing sheet after completion of the experiment and were thanked for 
their time. Participants completed the following tasks in the order listed below. 
 
EF ABILITY AND IMPLICIT RACE BIAS   11 
 
 
The first two tasks were indirect explicit tasks: 
Funding Task: Participants were given a letter informing them that the university needed 
to reduce funding for some of its student organizations and wanted input from the students. The 
letter asked them to rank a list of 29 organizations from 1 to 29 for continued funding, with 1 
being most important to fund and 29 being least important to fund. 
The list included organizations that involve different ethnic and racial groups (such as the 
African-American Student Association and the Argentine Tango Club) as well as other groups 
on campus (such as the Intervarsity Christian Fellowship and the Chess Club). In order to 
measure racial bias toward African Americans, scores on this task were calculated by averaging 
the ranks given to the Prospective Freshman Minority Visit Program, the Minority Arts and 
Sciences Program, the Summer Minority Access to Research Training Program, and the African-
American Student Association. Participants who put these four organizations near the end of 
their lists were given higher bias scores. 
  Seating Task: In this task, participants were shown pictures of different places and were 
asked to pick which seat they would choose to sit in if they entered the room. One or more seats 
in the pictures were “occupied” with faces of people with different genders and races, and the 
participants were given the option of choosing one of four different seats. The seats the 
participants were able to choose varied in distance from the people already “seated” in the 
picture (see Figure 1 for an example scene). Participants were told that the purpose of the task 
was to find out how people use public spaces. Participants who chose to sit further from African 
Americans than from Caucasians were given higher racial bias scores. 
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Next, participants completed two commonly used executive function tasks (e.g. Friedman 
et al., 2008; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000; Shah & Miyake, 1996). 
Participants were not told the purpose of these tasks: 
Antisaccade Task: Participants were instructed to look at a fixation point in the center of 
the computer screen (a “+” symbol) until they saw a flashing cue that would appear on either the 
left or right side of the screen (the fixation point would disappear at this time). The cue would 
flash for 175 ms, 200 ms, or 225 ms, depending on the block. Then a digit, 1 through 9, would be 
displayed. After 150 ms, this target was masked by a shaded box. Participants were instructed to 
say the number they saw out loud, and the numbers were recorded by the experimenter on the 
keyboard. If the participants had not seen the number, they were instructed to tell the 
experimenter their “best guess.” Once the number was entered, the fixation point would reappear 
in the center of the screen and the next trial would begin. 
In the first set of 12 practice trials and a block of 20 actual trials, the number appeared on 
the same side as the cue (prosaccade trials). In the next set of 12 practice trials and three blocks 
of 29 trials each, the number appeared on the opposite side of the cue (antisaccade trials). For the 
three antisaccade blocks, the number appeared more quickly with each subsequent block, such 
that it became increasingly more difficult to see the number after looking at the cue (the cue-to-
target interval decreased from 225 ms to 200 ms to 175 ms). Participants were informed prior to 
each block that the number would appear more quickly. 
This task measures inhibition ability, which is a type of executive function. Because 
participants are unable to look at both the cue and the number during the antisaccade trials, they 
must inhibit their reflexive (automatic) response to look at new stimuli in their visual fields (i.e. 
the flashing cue) in order to be able to see the number. Scores were calculated by looking at the 
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number of correct responses that were given on the antisaccade trials. A higher score indicates 
better inhibition ability. The reliability of this task has been shown to be .80 in previous research 
(Ito et al., 2013). 
Spatial Span: Participants were first shown a capital letter (“P,” “F,” or “R”) that was 
rotated and either in its normal orientation (e.g. P) or mirrored across its vertical plane 
(e.g.   ). Participants were instructed to tell the experimenter out loud whether the letter was 
“normal” or “mirrored” once the letter appeared on the screen. When the experimenter typed in 
“n” or “m,” respectively, on the keyboard, an arrow pointing in one of eight directions would 
appear on the screen for 750 ms and then another letter was shown. This sequence continued for 
a total of two to five iterations. 
At the end of each trial, a pink “???” symbol would appear on the screen. Participants 
were instructed to remember the sequence and direction of the arrows they had seen and write 
them down on a piece of paper when they saw the “???” symbol. The paper had a box for each 
trial with lines to represent the possible arrow directions. Participants were instructed to write the 
sequence number next to each line that corresponded to the direction the arrows had flashed on 
the screen. Once the participants had written down all of the arrows they remembered, the 
experimenter would start the next trial. Participants were instructed to skip writing down any 
arrows they did not remember, because incorrect arrows (direction or sequence) would be 
marked as incorrect. Participants did not have a time limit for responding to the letters or for 
writing down the arrows. 
This task measures working memory capacity (remembering the direction and sequence 
of the arrows) with distractors (the letters), which is a measure of executive function ability. 
Scores were calculated by determining the percentage of correct responses out of the total 
P 
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possible. Higher scores represent better working memory capacity. The reliability of this task has 
been shown to be .91 in previous research (Shah & Miyake, 1996). 
Following the EF tasks, participants completed two commonly used implicit bias tasks 
(e.g. Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002, 2007; Payne, 2001, 2005): 
Weapon Identification Task (WIT): Participants were instructed that the purpose of this 
task was to identify objects as guns or tools. First, participants were shown a black and white 
square with a scrambled pattern (mimicking static on a television screen) for 500 ms. Then, they 
were shown a picture of either a Black or a White male’s face (200 ms), followed by a picture of 
a gun or a tool (200 ms). Participants were told that the picture of the face was their cue that an 
object was going to appear. Finally, the picture of the object was masked by another static square 
(presented for 300 ms). Participants were instructed to press a button on a button box labeled 
“gun” or “tool” to identify the picture of the object they had seen. Once participants pressed 
either button, the next trial would begin. Each trial also had a set response deadline (length 
depended on the condition, see below) in which the participant needed to press either button or 
else a “TOO SLOW!” message flashed on the screen for 500 ms and the next trial would begin 
after a 1,000 ms inter-trial interval. 
Participants were given 10 practice trials, followed by one block of 128 actual trials. 
Before the actual trials, participants were instructed to respond “as QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE 
while also trying to be accurate.” 
Each participant completed one version of this task with a specific response window 
length: 400 ms, 600 ms, 800 ms, or 3,000 ms. The version administered to each participant was 
determined at random. 
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This task measures racial bias by comparing participants’ accuracy (i.e. correct 
responses) on stereotype-incongruent trials (those with a Black prime and a tool or a White 
prime and a gun) to accuracy on stereotype-congruent trials (those with a Black prime and a gun 
or a White prime and a tool). An accuracy bias score was calculated for each participant by 
subtracting the average accuracy on stereotype-incongruent trials from the average accuracy on 
stereotype-congruent trials. This gave a higher accuracy bias score to participants who made 
more stereotypical errors on stereotype-incongruent trials. The reliability of the WIT for 
accuracy bias has been shown to be .74 in previous research (Ito et al., 2013). 
Although accuracy served as a single dependent measure, participants’ response times 
were also used to create a second measure of racial bias, reaction time bias. The reaction time 
bias score was calculated by subtracting the average reaction time on stereotype-congruent trials 
from stereotype-incongruent trials. This gave a higher reaction time bias to participants who 
responded faster on stereotype-congruent trials than on stereotype-incongruent ones. The 
reliability of the WIT for reaction time bias has been shown to be .46 in previous research (at a 
response window length of 500 ms in Ito et al., 2013). 
First-Person Shooter Task (FPST): In this task, participants were instructed to make a 
decision to press a button labeled “shoot” or “don’t shoot” based on whether the person in the 
image on the computer screen was holding a gun or something that was not a gun (e.g. a wallet, 
cell phone, or soda can), respectively. Participants were told that the goal of the task was to shoot 
anyone holding a gun – the “bad guys.” The program flashed different background scenes (each 
was shown for 500 to 800 ms) and then inserted a person into the scene holding either a gun or a 
different object (shown for 590 ms), at which time the participants would press one of the two 
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buttons on the button box. The participants were given 12 practice trials followed by one block 
of 96 actual trials. 
If the participants responded correctly within the 590 ms response window deadline, they 
would receive 5 points if the object was not a gun or 10 points if the object was a gun. If the 
participants responded incorrectly, they would lose 20 points if the object was not a gun or 40 
points if the object was a gun. If the participants responded too slowly, they would lose 50 
points, and were instructed that because the penalty for being too slow was so high, it was very 
important for them to respond quickly. A different sound would play each time the participants 
responded correctly, incorrectly, or too slowly. Current points, the amount of points gained or 
lost, and a feedback message were shown after every response for 500 ms. The feedback 
messages were “Good shot” for correct shoot responses, “You shot a good guy!!” for incorrect 
shoot responses, “Wise choice” for correct don’t shoot responses, and “YOU’RE DEAD!!” for 
incorrect don’t shoot responses. Total points were also shown at the end of the task. 
This task measures racial bias in the same way as the WIT: an accuracy bias score was 
calculated by subtracting the average accuracy on stereotype-incongruent trials from the average 
accuracy on stereotype-congruent trials. The higher the accuracy bias scores, the more 
stereotypical errors the participants made on stereotype-incongruent trials. The reliability for the 
accuracy bias on the FPST has been shown to be .09 in previous research (Ito et al., 2013). 
Similar to the accuracy bias, a reaction time bias score was calculated by subtracting average 
reaction time on stereotype-congruent trials from average reaction time on stereotype-
incongruent trials, such that higher reaction time bias scores indicated faster responses to trials 
consistent with stereotypes. The reliability for reaction time bias on the FPST has been shown to 
be .07 in previous research (Ito et al., 2013). 
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Finally, participants completed a number of direct explicit measures to measure their 
overt attitudes toward Blacks and motivation to control prejudice. The direct explicit tasks 
included the Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (MCPR; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; 
reliability of .81 in Ito et al., 2013), the Internal and External Motivation to Respond without 
Prejudice Scales (iMCPR and eMCPR; Plant & Devine, 1998; reliability of .85 and .83, 
respectively in Ito et al., 2013), the Attitude Toward Blacks Scale (ATB; Brigham, 1993; 
reliability of .86 in Ito et al., 2013), and a series of feeling thermometers that asked participants 
to rate the “warmth” of their feelings toward different social groups (including African 
Americans and Caucasians). Sample items from each task are included in Appendix A. 
Participants were also asked for their race and gender. 
 
Results 
First, the effect of the WIT response window length manipulation was examined on the 
WIT accuracy (ACC) and reaction time (RT) biases, using separate univariate ANOVAs. The 
WIT response window was the only factor included in these analyses. The main effect of 
response window on ACC bias was significant, F(3, 110) = 5.46, p < .01 (see Figure 2), 
indicating that participants had different racial biases on the WIT for the four response window 
lengths. Participants had higher ACC biases for shorter response window lengths than for longer 
response window lengths (see Table 1). In order to examine which versions of the task induced a 
significant amount of racial bias in responses, four separate post-hoc one-sample t-tests were run, 
one for each condition. Only the 400 ms response window length was significantly different 
from zero, t = 3.08, p = .01, indicating that ACC bias was only present in the 400 ms condition 
(see Table 1). 
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 The main effect of WIT response window on RT bias was also significant, indicating that 
participants had different racial biases for the different WIT response window lengths, F(3, 110) 
= 2.77, p = .05. Participants had higher RT biases for longer response window lengths (see 
Figure 3). The four separate post-hoc one-sample t-tests showed that only the 800 ms condition 
was significantly different from zero, t = 2.38, p = .03, which indicates that RT bias was only 
present in the 800 ms condition (see Table 1). 
Next, how participants’ executive function (EF) ability influenced the amount of bias 
they showed in each WIT condition was examined. This was done using a univariate ANOVA 
that allowed for a categorical variable (WIT response window) to interact with a continuous 
variable (EF ability). In order to create a single measure of general EF, the scores from the two 
EF tasks (Antisaccade and Spatial Span) were converted into z-scores and then averaged. The EF 
tasks were significantly correlated with one another, r = .23, p = .01. The main effect of EF on 
ACC bias was not significant, F(1, 105) = 1.67, p = .20. The main effect of EF on RT bias was 
also not significant, F(1, 105) = 0.19, p = .67. The interaction of EF ability and WIT response 
window was not significant for ACC bias, F(3, 105) = 0.74, p = .53, but was significant for RT 
bias, F(3, 105) = 3.11, p = .03. 
In order to examine this interaction, WIT RT biases for the four different response 
windows were then compared to EF ability using basic bivariate correlation analyses. The EF 
composite variable was negatively correlated with RT bias for the 3,000 ms condition, r = -.37, p 
= .05 (Table 2), which indicates that participants with higher EF ability had lower reaction time 
biases when there was sufficient time for them to use their executive control. This was the only 
significant correlation to emerge, but the EF composite correlation with RT bias at 800 ms was 
marginally significant, r = .37, p = .07, albeit in the opposite direction of what was expected. 
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Finally, the relationships between the WIT responses and responses on the different 
implicit (FPST), indirect explicit (Funding and Seating tasks), and direct explicit tasks (MCPR, 
iMCPR and eMCPR, ATB, and the feeling thermometers) were examined. No significant 
correlations were found between the FPST and the WIT (see Table 3). This indicates that, in the 
current experiment, biases on the FPST were not equivalent to those on the WIT. 
The WIT biases were initially compared to the different explicit tasks on their own, only 
revealing a negative correlation between the Funding task and RT bias in the 600 ms response 
window, r = -.40, p = .03. There were also a few marginally significant findings (ps ≤ .08, see 
Table 4). Then, the WIT biases were compared to the different explicit tasks using two 
composite variables, one for Indirect Explicit Bias and one for Direct Explicit Bias, to see if any 
other relationships would emerge. The scores on the different explicit tasks were converted to z-
scores and scaled such that a higher score indicated a higher level of explicit bias. The 
correlations indicated that neither the Indirect Explicit Bias nor the Direct Explicit Bias was 
significantly correlated with the WIT biases for any condition (Table 4). The lack of correlations 
with the explicit bias tasks shows that bias on these tasks was not predictive of bias on the WIT 




 The goal of the current research was to determine the effect of executive function (EF) 
ability and response window length on a specific implicit measure of racial bias, the weapon 
identification task (WIT). In addition, the relationships between the accuracy and reaction time 
biases on the WIT and various direct and indirect explicit measures were explored. The biases on 
the WIT were also compared to those on the first-person shooter task (FPST). 
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 The results replicated previous research findings for the relationships between response 
window length and bias on the WIT (Payne, 2001; Payne et al., 2002), demonstrating that 
participants have higher accuracy (ACC) biases at shorter response windows and higher reaction 
time (RT) biases at longer response windows. In addition, the results did not show a significant 
main effect of EF ability on ACC bias or an interaction between EF ability and response window 
length on ACC bias, which did not replicate previous research (Payne, 2005; Payne & 
Gawronski, 2010). There were also no significant correlations between the WIT biases and the 
FPST biases, which does not replicate previous research (e.g. Ito et al., 2013). 
EF Ability and Racial Bias on the WIT 
 New results that have not been demonstrated in previous research emerged for the 
relationship between EF ability and RT bias. There was no main effect of EF ability on RT bias, 
but there was a significant interaction between EF ability and WIT response window for RT bias. 
At shorter response windows, EF ability did not affect RT bias (rs = -.07 and .12 for 400 ms and 
600 ms, respectively), but at longer response windows it did (rs = .37 and -.37 for 800 ms and 
3,000 ms, respectively). In the 3,000 ms condition it was observed that participants with higher 
EF ability had significantly less RT bias than participants with lower EF ability. One possible 
reason for this is that participants with lower EF ability may have acted more impulsively when 
stereotypes were activated, while participants with higher EF ability may have been more likely 
to quickly override the automatic associations on stereotype-incongruent trials. Further 
examination of the data demonstrated that there was no significant relationship between reaction 
times on stereotype-congruent trials and EF ability (r = -.02, p = .90) or for stereotype-
incongruent trials and EF ability (r = -.14, p = .46) for the 3,000 ms condition. Though the 
relationship was not significant, participants with lower EF ability tended to be slower on 
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stereotype-incongruent trials than on stereotype-congruent trials, whereas participants with 
higher EF ability tended to have similar reaction times between the two trial types. The fact that 
participants with lower EF ability were slowed down by stereotype-incongruent trials suggests 
that these participants needed to exert more effort to overcome their automatic responses than 
participants with higher EF ability. 
 However, in the 800 ms condition, there was a positive correlation between EF ability 
and RT bias rather than a negative one, which suggests that participants with higher EF ability 
responded more impulsively than participants with lower EF in this condition. It is unclear why 
the correlations have opposite signs between the 800 ms and 3,000 ms conditions, but it may be 
because the 3,000 ms response window length is much longer than any of the other conditions, 
so there is essentially no response deadline for this condition. Participants with lower EF ability 
had very similar RT biases across the 400 ms, 600 ms, and 800 ms, but had much higher RT 
biases for the 3,000 ms condition. The lack of differences between the three shorter response 
windows suggests that there was not enough time for participants with lower EF to exert 
executive control and these participants were therefore responding at the same rate to stereotype-
congruent and stereotype-incongruent trials. In the 3,000 ms condition, there was sufficient time 
for lower EF ability participants to exert control, so they made virtually no mistakes. When the 
participants were able to accurately respond without concentrating on responding within the 
deadline, they responded faster to stereotype-congruent trials, which led to the higher RT bias 
that was observed in the 3,000 ms condition for lower EF ability participants. 
It was not clear why participants with higher EF ability shifted from gradually increasing 
RT biases on the 400 ms, 600 ms, and 800 ms conditions to having much less RT bias when the 
response window was 3,000 ms. Further examination of the data showed that the 3,000 ms 
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condition did not have any participants with an EF ability larger than one standard deviation 
above the average, whereas all three of the shorter response window conditions did (at least three 
in each condition). Therefore, any analyses on how participants with high EF ability performed 
in the 3,000 ms condition were extrapolated estimates and not indicative of actual participant 
performance, so no conclusions can be made about how higher EF ability modulates 
performance in this condition. 
 Another possibility to consider for the above analyses is that the EF tasks were not good 
measures of EF ability, and therefore, the analyses using EF ability are not meaningful. This is 
supported by the low correlation between the Antisaccade and Spatial Span tasks (r = .23, p = 
.01). Previous research (e.g. Miyake et al., 2000) has demonstrated that different EF tasks have 
highly variable correlations to overall EF ability, especially when they measure different types of 
EF abilities. Because the current study only included two EF tasks and each task measured 
different EF abilities (i.e. inhibition and working memory), it is likely that the estimate for EF 
ability was not accurate. Using more EF tasks that measure similar EF abilities may significantly 
increase the validity of the results (see Ito et al., 2013). 
If EF ability is disregarded, there were still no clear results for the relationship between 
the different response windows and the ACC and RT biases. Only one of each type of bias was 
significantly different from zero for any of the response window lengths (400 ms for the ACC 
bias and 800 ms for the RT bias), which does not replicate previous findings using similar 
response window lengths – Payne (2001) used a 500 ms response window and an unlimited time 
condition and Payne et al. (2002) used 200 ms, 450 ms, and 700 ms response window lengths. 
Both Payne (2001) and Payne et al. (2002) had scores significantly different from zero for all 
conditions. In the current study, the results only followed the same basic pattern as this previous 
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work: as the response window length decreased, the RT bias decreased and the ACC bias 
increased. 
The lack of consistency in the WIT biases being significantly different from zero could 
potentially be due to the low number of participants per condition. But, previous research used 
approximately the same number of participants per condition with significant results (n of about 
30 participants in both Payne, 2001 and Payne et al., 2002). The standard deviations were 
smaller for reaction times in Payne (2001), though (about 63.5 ms for the unlimited time 
condition and 29.3 ms for the 500 ms condition). In the current study, the standard deviation for 
the 3,000 ms condition was 72.0 ms and averaged 53.0 ms for the 400 ms and 600 ms conditions 
combined. This indicates that despite the low number of participants, the RT biases in the Payne 
(2001) study were more consistent. On the other hand, the accuracies in Payne (2001) were 
comparable to the ones in the current study (accuracy of .09 for the unlimited time condition and 
.15 in the 500 ms condition in Payne, 2001, compared to an accuracy of .07 for the current 
study’s 3,000 ms condition with an average of .12 for the 400 ms and 600 ms conditions 
combined). Still, the larger spread of reaction times in the current experiment may have 
contributed to the lack of consistency in the RT bias results. Having more participants may 
increase the consistency of RT bias and ACC bias scores (see Ito et al., 2013). 
 It is also possible that the larger standard deviations for the different conditions are 
related to exposure to Blacks. The current study was done at the University of Colorado Boulder, 
while the Payne (2001) and Payne et al. (2002) work were conducted at Washington University 
in St. Louis, Missouri. Washington University has much more diversity than the University of 
Colorado, with about 58% Caucasians and 6% African Americans (Washington University in St. 
Louis, 2010) versus 75% Caucasians and 2% African Americans at the University of Colorado 
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(College Portrait, 2012). In addition, St. Louis, Missouri has many more African Americans and 
Blacks – 49.2% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b) compared to 0.9% in Boulder (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2010a). Because the participants from the current study had much less exposure to 
African Americans and Blacks, the accessibility of racial stereotypes may have been different for 
these participants compared to the participants in the Payne (2001) and Payne et al. (2002) 
studies, which could have impacted all of the results in the current study. 
FPST and Racial Bias on the WIT 
 Analyses to determine the relationship of the ACC and RT biases on the FPST with the 
ACC and RT biases on the WIT demonstrated that none of the FPST biases correlated with the 
WIT biases for the different response window lengths. This is inconsistent with previous 
research that has demonstrated a significant, albeit weak, correlation between the two tasks (e.g. 
r = .17, p ≤ .05 in Ito et al., 2013). It is important to note that the low reliability of the FPST (r = 
.09 for ACC bias and .07 for RT bias, as determined by Ito et al., 2013) may contribute to the 
lack of relationships found in the current study. Having more participants complete the study 
would likely yield similar results to previous research. 
In addition, previous research has shown that participants can be influenced to respond 
differently on implicit tasks based on what information is made salient to them (Han, Czellar, 
Olson, & Fazio, 2010; see Blair, 2002). Therefore, it is possible that administering the FPST 
right after the WIT may have led participants to have a different interpretation of the task than if 
the FPST were to be administered alone. For example, having already completed the WIT may 
have made participants more likely to think, “mistaking guns for tools makes me look racist 
when there are Black faces presented before the objects – I should be more careful about 
shooting Black people on this new task, because I don’t want to look racist.” Or, the WIT may 
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have simply made race more salient on the FPST. It is unclear which possibility is more likely, 
because neither of the FPST biases was significantly different from zero. The ACC bias was 
marginally significant, but negative, which indicates less racial bias on the task, t = -1.91, p = 
.06. The RT bias was not significant, t = 0.17, p = .87, indicating no racial bias in terms of 
reaction times on the task. Previous research has demonstrated that making race salient increases 
bias (e.g. Payne et al., 2002), but the results of the current study do not replicate this finding. 
Explicit Measures and Racial Bias on the WIT 
 Analyses on the relationship between the explicit tasks and the WIT biases revealed only 
one significant correlation. The Funding task was negatively correlated with RT bias at the 600 
ms response window. Because there were no other significant correlations (although there were a 
few marginally significant findings), this result was likely a Type I error. The explicit biases 
were converted into two composite variables (one for Indirect Explicit Bias, the other for Direct 
Explicit Bias) to see if there were any overall correlations. Neither of these two composite 
variables correlated to the WIT ACC or RT biases. Previous research has demonstrated that there 
are weak correlations between implicit bias scores and scores on explicit measures (Payne, 2001; 
see Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). The current study sporadically replicated these findings. 
Similarly, previous research using latent variable analyses has shown that an internal 
motivation to control prejudice is negatively correlated with implicit bias task scores and that an 
external motivation to control prejudice is positively correlated with implicit bias scores (Ito et 
al., 2013). Latent variable analysis could not be used in the present study due to the low number 
of participants in each condition. It is possible that more consistent correlations would have 
emerged if there were a sufficient number of participants to conduct this more advanced analysis. 
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Practical Applications of Implicit Bias Tasks 
 While the current research did not demonstrate clear relationships between executive 
control and bias on the WIT, previous research has shown that EF ability can be used to predict 
ACC bias (Payne, 2005). Therefore, it is important to consider the practical applications of tasks 
such as the WIT and FPST rather than only looking at their theoretical implications. Classic 
studies such as Word, Zanna, and Cooper (1974) demonstrate that automatic stereotyping can 
have a significant impact on how people present themselves and how others view them in return. 
In the first experiment of the Word et al. (1974) work, White participants in the position of 
interviewers tended to rate Black confederates in the position of interviewees as less qualified for 
a job position. The behavior of the participants and the confederates was analyzed, and it was 
found that the participants sat further away from the Black interviewee (compared to the White 
interviewee), conducted shorter interviews, and made more speech errors. In the second 
experiment, White confederates were put in the role of interviewers to see whether there was a 
difference in interviewee performance when the interviewer sat further away from the 
interviewee and made more speech errors (as the participants in the first experiment had behaved 
when interviewing the Black confederates). The participants who were interviewed in this 
manner were subsequently rated as less qualified, and they reported feeling less calm during the 
interview and having a more negative mood following the interview. The Word et al. (1974) 
study demonstrated that people’s actions may be unintentionally discriminatory and that these 
actions may make receivers anxious, which will further decrease people’s impressions of them. 
 Other studies have indicated that implicit racial bias scores are significantly correlated 
with nonverbal friendliness of interactions with Blacks (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; 
McConnell & Leibold, 2001). These studies, in conjunction with the Word et al. (1974) and 
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Devine (1989) work predict that stereotypes can unintentionally influence people’s actions 
toward and evaluations of other people. Unintended prejudice and discrimination can have 
unfortunate consequences for well-qualified job applicants, patients seeking medical assistance, 
and others, simply because of their race, gender, or other group membership (see Jost et al., 2009 
for a list of ten important studies). 
 The importance of unintended prejudice and discrimination is especially critical in split-
second situations that can mean the difference between life and death, as when police need to 
make a decision to shoot a person who is perceived to be holding a gun. The media has presented 
many cases of police mistakenly shooting unarmed African Americans and Blacks, which 
demonstrates that automatic associations can potentially influence split-second decisions to shoot 
suspects (Correll et al., 2002; Payne, 2001; Plant & Peruche, 2005). Although it is not possible to 
directly measure how automatically activated stereotypes influence real-life decisions, it is 
important to theoretically assess how executive control plays a role in reducing the influence of 
automatic associations in order to prevent unintended discrimination. Plant and Peruche (2005) 
found that with practice, police officers will show less racial bias on the FPST, indicating that the 
criteria officers use to shoot are influenced by their ability to control their responses. The Plant 
and Peruche (2005) work supports the idea that automatic prejudice and discrimination can be 
reduced. Still, the FPST is only a theoretical measure of discrimination, and reimplementing the 
task in a more real-world scenario or simulation might provide a better picture of how EF ability 
influences split-second decisions. 
Conclusion 
 Although the current study cannot be used to address how unintentional prejudice and 
discrimination affect people in real-world situations, it is useful on a theoretical level. Each 
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participant completed two EF tasks (to measure participants’ abilities to control their responses) 
as well as one version of the WIT (as a measure of implicit racial bias). There were few 
significant results, but many of the patterns found in this study replicate previous research and 
demonstrate that EF ability plays an important role in modulating how people respond to 
stereotype-congruent versus stereotype-incongruent information when there is a time constraint. 
However, further research needs to be done before any conclusions can be drawn from the 
current study. 
 Future research should include more participants per condition and more EF tasks, which 
will increase the possibility of obtaining significant results. It may also be useful to prescreen 
participants for their motivation to control prejudice before participating in the study. 
Preselecting participants based on their prejudice levels was used in the Devine (1989) work to 
obfuscate the purpose of the studies, and a similar procedure could be used with the present 
methodology to ensure that performing the WIT and FPST would not influence answers on the 
explicit measures. The above changes would significantly increase the validity of the results and 
give further insight into how to study implicit racial bias as well as what potential avenues exist 
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WIT Accuracy Bias and Reaction Time Bias Descriptive Statistics  
Response    Bias Test 
Window Bias Type Mean (SD) N T-value P-value 
400 ms ACC 0.10 (0.17) 29 3.08 .01** 
 RT -4.43 (18.00) 29 -1.33 .20 
600 ms ACC 0.01 (0.10) 30 0.41 .69 
 RT -0.08 (17.37) 30 -0.03 .98 
800 ms ACC 0.02 (0.05) 26 1.93 .07 
 RT 7.73 (16.54) 26 2.38 .03* 
3000 ms ACC < 0.01 (0.04) 29 0.09 .93 
 RT 7.87 (24.62) 29 1.72 .10 
Note. ACC = accuracy, RT = reaction time. The Bias Test determined whether the amount of 
bias was significantly different from zero (i.e. one-sample t-test). 













WIT Bias Correlations to Executive Function Tasks 
Response 
Window 




600 ms .17 .12 






Note. ACC = accuracy, RT = reaction time. 
Significant and marginally significant findings are in bold, *p < .05, 
†
p = .07 
  




WIT Bias Correlations to FPST Biases 
Response 
Window 
FPST Bias  ACC Correlation RT Correlation 
400 ms
 
ACC .03 -.16 
 
RT -.33 -.03 
600 ms
 
ACC .23 -.19 
 
RT .05 .08 
800 ms ACC .31 -.13 
 
RT .08 .01 
3000 ms
 
ACC -.18 .24 
 
RT -.23 .13 








WIT Bias Correlations to Explicit Tasks 
Response 
Window 
Explicit Variable ACC Correlation RT Correlation 
400 ms
 Direct Composite .20 -.02 
 MCPR -.14 .01 
 eMCPR -.21 .14 
 iMCPR -.12 .08 
 ATB .20 -.05 
 Feeling Thermometers .08 .18 
 Indirect Composite -.16 -.11 
 Funding Task -.07 -.07 
 Seating Task -.12 -.07 
600 ms Direct Composite .01 -.27 
 MCPR .04 .15 
 eMCPR .11 .01 
 iMCPR .14 .24 
 ATB .07 -.34
†
 
 Feeling Thermometers .24 -.07 
 Indirect Composite .15 -.24 
 Funding Task -.13 -.40* 
 Seating Task .35
†
 .07 
800 ms Direct Composite -.04 -.33 
 MCPR -.16 .02 
 eMCPR -.19 .23 
 iMCPR .16 .26 
 ATB -.13 -.21 
 Feeling Thermometers -.16 -.27 
 Indirect Composite -.21 -.25 
 Funding Task -.18 -.14 
 Seating Task -.14 -.25 







 iMCPR .31 -.21 
 ATB -.03 .20 
 Feeling Thermometers .29 .15 
 Indirect Composite .18 -.14 
 Funding Task .09 < -.01 
 Seating Task .16 -.19 
Note. ACC = accuracy, RT = reaction time, MCPR = Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale, eMCPR = 
External Motivation to Respond without Prejudice Scale, iMCPR = Internal Motivation to Respond without 
Prejudice Scale, ATB = Attitude Toward Blacks Scale. 
Significant and marginally significant findings are in bold, *p < .05, 
†
p ≤ .08  











Figure 1. Example scene from the Seating task. 














Figure 2. Mean in-window accuracy bias for all WIT conditions. 
ACC = accuracy. Error-bars represent the 95% confidence 
interval. 










Figure 3. Mean in-window reaction time bias for all WIT 
conditions. RT = reaction time. Error-bars represent the 95% 
confidence interval. 




Motivation to Control Prejudiced Responses Sample (nine-point Likert scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree): 
 “Because of today’s PC (politically correct) standards, I try to appear nonprejudiced 
toward Black people.” 
 “According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is ok.” 
 “I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people.” 
 
Internal and External Motivation to Control Prejudice Sample (seven-point Likert scale 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree): 
  “I feel guilty when I have a negative thought or feeling about a Black person.” (Internal 
Motivation) 
 “It bothers me a great deal when I think I’ve offended someone, so I’m always careful to 
consider other people’s feelings.” (Internal Motivation) 
 “It’s important to me that other people not think I’m prejudiced.” (External Motivation) 
 “I’m not afraid to tell others what I think, even when I know they disagree with me.” 
(External Motivation) 
 
Attitude Toward Blacks Scale Sample (seven-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree): 
 “I would rather not have Black people live in the same apartment building I live in.” 
 “I get very upset when I hear a White person make a prejudicial remark about Black 
people.” 
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 “The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices Black 
people suffer at the hands of local authorities.” 
 
Feeling Thermometer Sample (one-hundred-point scale from very coolly to very 
warmly): 
 “How warmly or coolly do you feel about... African Americans?” 
 “How warmly or coolly do you feel about... Gay men?” 
 “How warmly or coolly do you feel about... Hispanics?” 
